32 research outputs found
An Examination of Some Aspects of Howard Stein's Work
Some understand Steinâs âYes, butâŠâ as an entry in the realismâinstrumentalism debate (RID) itself, albeit one dissatisfied with then-extant positions. In this paper, however, I argue the opposite: Steinâs conception of science and his approach to its history and philosophy actually preclude the RID. First, I characterize Stein as persistently attending to his own historical and philosophical methods. I then describe his conception of science as both a dialectic and an enterprise, and I draw from this conception several conclusions about the relations between science and its history and philosophy. Finally, I provide a reading of âYes, butâŠâ that follows from Steinâs conception of science. On this reading, the RID is either irrelevant to or wrong of science and, moreover, distracts from a legitimate inquiry. I conclude by interpreting Steinâs remark that there is ``no difference that makes a differenceââ between a cogent and enlightened realism and a sophisticated instrumentalism
Hilbert-Style Axiomatic Completion: The (Not So) Hidden Contextuality of von Neumann's "No Hidden Variables" Theorem
In this paper I provide a detailed history of von Neumannâs âNo Hidden Variablesâ theorem, and I argue it is a demonstration that his axiomatization mathematically captures a salient feature of the statistical interpretation (namely, that hidden variables are incompatible). I show that this reading of von Neumannâs theorem is obvious once one recalls several contextual factors of his work. First, his axiomatization was what I call a Hilbert-style axiomatic completion; indeed, it developed from work initiated by Hilbert (and Nordheim). Second, it was responsive to specific mathematical and theoretical problems faced by Dirac and Jordanâs statistical transformation theory (then called âquantum mechanicsâ). Third, the axiomatization was essentially completed already in his 1927 papers, at least concerning the status of hidden variables, and this would have been obvious to the audience for those papers. Thus, the theoremâs statement and proof were only necessary when the material was presented for a general mathematical audience, i.e., in his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics . With this reading in mind, his claim that quantum mechanics was in âcompelling logical contradiction with causalityâ appears as a straightforward consequence of his theorem. I conclude by reassessing the theoremâs broader historical and scientific significance
Why Should Identity Be Harmonious?
Logical inferentialists have expected identity to be susceptible of harmonious
introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction. While Read and Klev have
proposed rules they argue are harmonious, Griffiths and Ahmed have criticized these
rules as insufficient for harmony. These critics moreover suggest that no harmonious
rules are forthcoming. I argue that these critics are correct: the logical inferentialist
should abandon hope for harmonious rules for identity. The paper analyzes the three
major uses of identity in presumed-logical languages: variable coordination, definitional
substitution, and co-reference. We show that identity qua variable coordination is not
logical by providing a harmonious natural-deduction system that captures this use
through the quantifiers. We then argue that identity qua definitional substitution or co-reference faces a dilemma: either its rules are harmonious but they obscure its actual
use in inference, or its rules are not harmonious but they make its actual use in
inference plain. We conclude that the inferentialist may have harmonious rules for
identity only by disrespecting its inferential use
An Examination of Some Aspects of Howard Stein's Work
Some understand Steinâs âYes, butâŠâ as an entry in the realismâinstrumentalism debate (RID) itself, albeit one dissatisfied with then-extant positions. In this paper, however, I argue the opposite: Steinâs conception of science and his approach to its history and philosophy actually preclude the RID. First, I characterize Stein as persistently attending to his own historical and philosophical methods. I then describe his conception of science as both a dialectic and an enterprise, and I draw from this conception several conclusions about the relations between science and its history and philosophy. Finally, I provide a reading of âYes, butâŠâ that follows from Steinâs conception of science. On this reading, the RID is either irrelevant to or wrong of science and, moreover, distracts from a legitimate inquiry. I conclude by interpreting Steinâs remark that there is ``no difference that makes a differenceââ between a cogent and enlightened realism and a sophisticated instrumentalism
Physical soil development of two created wetlands at the Olentangy River Wetland Research Park
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Net primary productivity of macrophyte communities in the experimental marshes after eleven growing seasons
The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history